1. I must be getting this wrong but it sounds as if Scotus is anthropomorphizing God. We little humans live in a world of probability and choice. Newtonian physics and Einstein's theories of relativity, at one point in time, seemed to provide an account of a predictable and deterministic universe. Several experiments in quantum physics (the double-slit experiment, experiments involving quantum entanglement) made the universe seem less determined and more a series of smeared probabilities. It seems like Scotus is giving God the wiggle room that quantum physics made apparent of the universe. A thing can change (like a particles location) until it occurs (is measured). The language in the writing was very confusing and it seemed like Scotus said God's will and his knowledge were both changing and unchanging. It seemed as if he was attempting to explain how certain events, like the coming of the Antichrist, were necessary and known to God with certainty but other events were contingent and not yet known to God.
2. An example of a statement that both confused and clarified "since God's knowing is necessary without qualification, it is not lessened in that necessity by the fact that it relates to something contingent" (263). He argues that this does not make an event determined. God's will can change but God knows his will. He is free to choose but also knows his choice. It seems like some consistency issues could be more easily resolved by rewriting or at least editing heavily the parts of the Bible that refer to God's capacities and limitations. It is almost as if these theologians are trying to explain away the contradictions in a paper written by an undergrad instead of just having the student rewrite it.
1. I'm not sure that I followed Scotus very well -- perhaps because this is our first reading back from break and I am trying to tackle it on a Monday morning before class -- Nonetheless, I found it interesting how Scotus argued against the claim that God has immutable knowledge of everything in respect of every condition of existence. Scotus states that there can't be an immutable state behind a transition from one contradiction to the other because this would imply some change in that state. For example, as Scotus states, God cannot know A but also know A at the same time because this would imply a change in God's state and His immutability does not allow for this.
2. It seems that Scotus is arguing for a necessity in God's will while allowing for a contingency in creation. Scotus states, "Some things are necessary in relation to divine knowledge, it, nevertheless, does to follow that they are not able to be contingent in relation to their proximate causes" (266). I don't follow all of his argument but He seems to find support in it through Boethius. Arguing that what God sees in existence from outside of existence is necessary to God, yet in existence this thing that God sees is still free to change.
1) It seems that Duns Scotus is a very challenging theologian to get a good grasp on, nevertheless I will try my best to put my Duns cap on and attempt to understand his position. It seems that he rejects negative theology in favor of defining God in terms of what he is, namely a very simple infinitely perfect being. It is for this reason that I believe him to be making the argument that emphasizes Gods ability to do anything. 2) It seems that he rejects Aquinas’s notion of dialectical reasoning as a method to understand God. In its place a God with absolute power to do even what we humans believe to be incomprehensible or impossible. This view seems to be more compatible with actual Christian doctrine than does the more philosophical model of aquinas.
1) It seems that Duns Scotus is a very challenging theologian to get a good grasp on, nevertheless I will try my best to put my Duns cap on and attempt to understand his position. It seems that he rejects negative theology in favor of defining God in terms of what he is, namely a very simple infinitely perfect being. It is for this reason that I believe him to be making the argument that emphasizes Gods ability to do anything. 2) It seems that he rejects Aquinas’s notion of dialectical reasoning as a method to understand God. In its place a God with absolute power to do even what we humans believe to be incomprehensible or impossible. This view seems to be more compatible with actual Christian doctrine than does the more philosophical model of aquinas.
I notice Scotus wants to make a similar distinction as some of the other theologians we studied claiming a distinction between determinate knowledge and non-determinate knowledge. This is the typical way of getting out of the issue by affirming that knowledge of something is not determining it and he wants to claim that God does not posses this knowledge of everything but instead has indeterminate knowledge. I can see this being issue in relation to God's omnipotence.
I am having some trouble understanding some of what Scotus is arguing in the first question but it seems as though he is arguing that having only one type of knowledge (determinate) would actually hinder God's omnipotence. This is interesting and I hope to grasp this idea better because it seems as though the opposite is true.
My initial take on Scotus is not at all very clear but it seems that his stance on the omnipotence of God is strong and prevalent that he is in fact omnipotent and has the ability to do anything with no limitations. He makes this apparently clear early on by claiming if he was limited in anyway then it would debunk any other future inferences about God making it impossible for him to be anything other than omnipotent. 2. The discussion on the potentiality of the opposite of something being the case, and whether the potential exist in its act or before the act is very confusing to me because I can't understand if he s saying the that the opposite is the main being or if it merely a secondary thing used to better define or place potentiality to the opposite.
I found this reading one of the more difficult ones we had so far. Not because of the volcabulary or style but the arguments didnt make much sense to me. I dont understand how God knows everything that will happen but he can also change his will. But he knows he will change his will before doing it. This seems confusing to me to actually understand in a practicle sense.
The fact that god changes his will but knows he will is frustrating. I personly like the arguments where god has no free will because he is the ulitmate good and cant make bad decisions. This to me a more linar thought processs that has real worl aplication.
1.) It's very troubling to stay on top of Scotus work, But I feel like he is choosing the side that God isn't all knowing. I say this because in his argument he goes to talk about the contradictory, and if there is an object that isn't already developed but can start the process of being developed that means that God has to alter his actions to this object because he doesn't know. Therefore he has the opportunity to know after the object is fully processed. 2.) I found the part of free will interesting where Scotus explains how the first part of the will has imperfection, but the middle has no imperfection at all but has a necessary for perfection. I find this interesting because the will that has a necessary for perfection, does that will help the will that doesn't have any means for perfection?
1) This piece from Duns Scotus was difficult for me to get through, mostly from the length, but also because of the complexity of his argument. What I could grasp was that Scotus was trying to prove that God can know what his will will be, but at the same time has the ability to alter his will (and the necessities that arise from them?). 2) I wonder if this creates some problems in Christianity. Is it possible to know what God's will is? If he can change his will at anytime, is God making choices as he's going along? How often is God having to defy previous will to set forward a new will? Can we ever know this?
1. It seems to me that it is possible to grant God the knowledge that one chooses for him to have based on the definition that one assigns to God. As long as the framework fits together, however much knowledge one chooses to assign to God is feasible. I'm coming to wonder why it matters how much knowledge God has in the first place.
2. Something struck me as off about argument 2.2.1. I understand what he is trying to say, but to say that God "knows" that something is going to happen tomorrow implies not just 100% confidence on his part. It also implies that the thing does in fact happen (although God may believe with 100% confidence and be mistaken). The two propositions are mutually exclusive. I may just be quibbling over the definitions of words but it may be important. It sounds as if Scotus is robbing God of the capacity to have knowledge before he even hypothesizes the scenario.
Scotus organizes his writings as questions, propositions, and responses/objections. And while in the past we’ve established this was a popular style, I feel as though when the number or questions reaches five or more, the argument as a whole feels less effective. I understand Scotus’s reservations about and objections to the five propositions he begins this section with, however as I get deeper into the section and he addresses other opinions I worry that my understanding of the ambitious goal of this piece is hindered by the fact that it is not five or so shorter papers each answering one of the questions rather than proceeding through five questions, five propositions, five objections, and then five more suggested solutions.
That said, when he does get around to his answers to the questions, his solutions are reminiscent of earlier attempts, like distinguishing the difference between necessary and possible, and maintaining an interpretation of contingency that is compatible with necessary “dogma” (for lack of a better word.)
Upon reading the piece it seems that Scoutus rejects Aquinas’ belief that dialectical reasoning can help one understand God. He believes more in God’s omnipotence that God can achieve feats that are difficult for the human mind to understand. Scoutus’ belief follows that of the ideas that come directly from the bible.
Scoutus seems to want to differentiate between God ability to be all-knowing and the ability of man to have free will. He argues that just because God knows what action people will take does not limit their free will. People still have the ability to make choices but God just knows what these decisions will be.
1. I must be getting this wrong but it sounds as if Scotus is anthropomorphizing God. We little humans live in a world of probability and choice. Newtonian physics and Einstein's theories of relativity, at one point in time, seemed to provide an account of a predictable and deterministic universe. Several experiments in quantum physics (the double-slit experiment, experiments involving quantum entanglement) made the universe seem less determined and more a series of smeared probabilities. It seems like Scotus is giving God the wiggle room that quantum physics made apparent of the universe. A thing can change (like a particles location) until it occurs (is measured). The language in the writing was very confusing and it seemed like Scotus said God's will and his knowledge were both changing and unchanging. It seemed as if he was attempting to explain how certain events, like the coming of the Antichrist, were necessary and known to God with certainty but other events were contingent and not yet known to God.
ReplyDelete2. An example of a statement that both confused and clarified "since God's knowing is necessary without qualification, it is not lessened in that necessity by the fact that it relates to something contingent" (263). He argues that this does not make an event determined. God's will can change but God knows his will. He is free to choose but also knows his choice. It seems like some consistency issues could be more easily resolved by rewriting or at least editing heavily the parts of the Bible that refer to God's capacities and limitations. It is almost as if these theologians are trying to explain away the contradictions in a paper written by an undergrad instead of just having the student rewrite it.
1. I'm not sure that I followed Scotus very well -- perhaps because this is our first reading back from break and I am trying to tackle it on a Monday morning before class -- Nonetheless, I found it interesting how Scotus argued against the claim that God has immutable knowledge of everything in respect of every condition of existence. Scotus states that there can't be an immutable state behind a transition from one contradiction to the other because this would imply some change in that state. For example, as Scotus states, God cannot know A but also know A at the same time because this would imply a change in God's state and His immutability does not allow for this.
ReplyDelete2. It seems that Scotus is arguing for a necessity in God's will while allowing for a contingency in creation. Scotus states, "Some things are necessary in relation to divine knowledge, it, nevertheless, does to follow that they are not able to be contingent in relation to their proximate causes" (266). I don't follow all of his argument but He seems to find support in it through Boethius. Arguing that what God sees in existence from outside of existence is necessary to God, yet in existence this thing that God sees is still free to change.
1) It seems that Duns Scotus is a very challenging theologian to get a good grasp on, nevertheless I will try my best to put my Duns cap on and attempt to understand his position. It seems that he rejects negative theology in favor of defining God in terms of what he is, namely a very simple infinitely perfect being. It is for this reason that I believe him to be making the argument that emphasizes Gods ability to do anything.
ReplyDelete2) It seems that he rejects Aquinas’s notion of dialectical reasoning as a method to understand God. In its place a God with absolute power to do even what we humans believe to be incomprehensible or impossible. This view seems to be more compatible with actual Christian doctrine than does the more philosophical model of aquinas.
1) It seems that Duns Scotus is a very challenging theologian to get a good grasp on, nevertheless I will try my best to put my Duns cap on and attempt to understand his position. It seems that he rejects negative theology in favor of defining God in terms of what he is, namely a very simple infinitely perfect being. It is for this reason that I believe him to be making the argument that emphasizes Gods ability to do anything.
ReplyDelete2) It seems that he rejects Aquinas’s notion of dialectical reasoning as a method to understand God. In its place a God with absolute power to do even what we humans believe to be incomprehensible or impossible. This view seems to be more compatible with actual Christian doctrine than does the more philosophical model of aquinas.
I notice Scotus wants to make a similar distinction as some of the other theologians we studied claiming a distinction between determinate knowledge and non-determinate knowledge. This is the typical way of getting out of the issue by affirming that knowledge of something is not determining it and he wants to claim that God does not posses this knowledge of everything but instead has indeterminate knowledge. I can see this being issue in relation to God's omnipotence.
ReplyDeleteI am having some trouble understanding some of what Scotus is arguing in the first question but it seems as though he is arguing that having only one type of knowledge (determinate) would actually hinder God's omnipotence. This is interesting and I hope to grasp this idea better because it seems as though the opposite is true.
My initial take on Scotus is not at all very clear but it seems that his stance on the omnipotence of God is strong and prevalent that he is in fact omnipotent and has the ability to do anything with no limitations. He makes this apparently clear early on by claiming if he was limited in anyway then it would debunk any other future inferences about God making it impossible for him to be anything other than omnipotent.
ReplyDelete2. The discussion on the potentiality of the opposite of something being the case, and whether the potential exist in its act or before the act is very confusing to me because I can't understand if he s saying the that the opposite is the main being or if it merely a secondary thing used to better define or place potentiality to the opposite.
I found this reading one of the more difficult ones we had so far. Not because of the volcabulary or style but the arguments didnt make much sense to me. I dont understand how God knows everything that will happen but he can also change his will. But he knows he will change his will before doing it. This seems confusing to me to actually understand in a practicle sense.
ReplyDeleteThe fact that god changes his will but knows he will is frustrating. I personly like the arguments where god has no free will because he is the ulitmate good and cant make bad decisions. This to me a more linar thought processs that has real worl aplication.
1.) It's very troubling to stay on top of Scotus work, But I feel like he is choosing the side that God isn't all knowing. I say this because in his argument he goes to talk about the contradictory, and if there is an object that isn't already developed but can start the process of being developed that means that God has to alter his actions to this object because he doesn't know. Therefore he has the opportunity to know after the object is fully processed.
ReplyDelete2.) I found the part of free will interesting where Scotus explains how the first part of the will has imperfection, but the middle has no imperfection at all but has a necessary for perfection. I find this interesting because the will that has a necessary for perfection, does that will help the will that doesn't have any means for perfection?
1) This piece from Duns Scotus was difficult for me to get through, mostly from the length, but also because of the complexity of his argument. What I could grasp was that Scotus was trying to prove that God can know what his will will be, but at the same time has the ability to alter his will (and the necessities that arise from them?).
ReplyDelete2) I wonder if this creates some problems in Christianity. Is it possible to know what God's will is? If he can change his will at anytime, is God making choices as he's going along? How often is God having to defy previous will to set forward a new will? Can we ever know this?
1. It seems to me that it is possible to grant God the knowledge that one chooses for him to have based on the definition that one assigns to God. As long as the framework fits together, however much knowledge one chooses to assign to God is feasible. I'm coming to wonder why it matters how much knowledge God has in the first place.
ReplyDelete2. Something struck me as off about argument 2.2.1. I understand what he is trying to say, but to say that God "knows" that something is going to happen tomorrow implies not just 100% confidence on his part. It also implies that the thing does in fact happen (although God may believe with 100% confidence and be mistaken). The two propositions are mutually exclusive. I may just be quibbling over the definitions of words but it may be important. It sounds as if Scotus is robbing God of the capacity to have knowledge before he even hypothesizes the scenario.
Scotus organizes his writings as questions, propositions, and responses/objections. And while in the past we’ve established this was a popular style, I feel as though when the number or questions reaches five or more, the argument as a whole feels less effective. I understand Scotus’s reservations about and objections to the five propositions he begins this section with, however as I get deeper into the section and he addresses other opinions I worry that my understanding of the ambitious goal of this piece is hindered by the fact that it is not five or so shorter papers each answering one of the questions rather than proceeding through five questions, five propositions, five objections, and then five more suggested solutions.
ReplyDeleteThat said, when he does get around to his answers to the questions, his solutions are reminiscent of earlier attempts, like distinguishing the difference between necessary and possible, and maintaining an interpretation of contingency that is compatible with necessary “dogma” (for lack of a better word.)
Upon reading the piece it seems that Scoutus rejects Aquinas’ belief that dialectical reasoning can help one understand God. He believes more in God’s omnipotence that God can achieve feats that are difficult for the human mind to understand. Scoutus’ belief follows that of the ideas that come directly from the bible.
ReplyDeleteScoutus seems to want to differentiate between God ability to be all-knowing and the ability of man to have free will. He argues that just because God knows what action people will take does not limit their free will. People still have the ability to make choices but God just knows what these decisions will be.