1. The question Boethius raised concerning prayer was intriguing. It seems as though if the world is pre-ordained by God, then praying to God for His intervention in future events would seem completely futile. This is evident when he states, "for what even should any man hope fore or pray to be averted when an inflexible course links all that can be desired."
2. Overall, I thought that this discussion from Book V of the Consolation was very indicative of the scholastic rationalist view as a whole. Most specifically was when it was proposed, "let us suppose that there is foreknowledge, but that it enjoins no necessity on things; there will remain, I think, that same freedom of the will, whole and absolute." This quote is clearly indicative of the scholastic rationalist view and it shows the problem of the view. Namely, that God's ability to intervene in creation is limited in this view and how is this squared with His omnipotence?
I enjoyed the platonist dialogue format Boethius decided to use for this writing as well as the way the question of chance is approached. He talks about chance is a product of a cause that produced an outcome that it did not originally mean to cause. I feel like this is the beginnings of an attempt to allow for some form of freedom in a world that seems to be determined.
The dialogue gets more interesting as the topic of free will comes further into question. Philosophy personified gives a bare notion of free will which is simply about the capacity to reason have make choices or think about what to desire and avoid. However it was interesting to see how Boethius furthers the question in relation to God's foreknowledge.
1. The place where thoughts and judgements meet the world is an interesting place to attempt to navigate. The other speaker in Boethius's writing posits an interesting idea. Our reason, our ability to judges and discriminate, to assign meaning via definition to the world is what gives us free will. Our free will still must interact with the concatenation of near endless cause and effect. We intend to prepare a field for farming and up comes a bubbling goo, black gold, oil that is. Our expectations don't necessarily match the objective world. We are free to be as wise or as foolish as we desire, given the tools we have but we cannot escape the physical world completely.
2. All of space and time are one thing for God "a never passing instant" (238). He is simultaneously future, present and past and they are all his present. He does not have 'foreknowledge', he simply knows his now. The idea reminds me of what I came to think of as universal consciousness and my concept of Nirvana. Of course, in the judeo-christian tradition we are not all God (Buddha), we are separate things. The idea of God's limitlessness is still interesting, even if we see it as an unapproachable infinite. We are defined by out limitation in opposition to other things and God is 'defined' as being not limited. Our mistake in this line of reasoning is to try and be God or to see his perspective as he sees it. The mistake in the estimation of some Buddhists and Taoists is not to join the whole or the immortal oneness. When I was younger, I thought it was best to try and merge with the universal consciousness, to forget all of the things that made me think I was an individual. Now I see that idea of no unique or real self being wrongly applied by social constructionists as a power game and I see the value of the limited and unique individual in opposition to that game. We build a logical framework that matches what we encounter as closely as we can, we examine anomalies and rewrite our propositions or even our entire framework as is necessary to account for new information. There is progress but we never reach the infinite. We are never God. Though I think that it may be a possibility if the intelligence singularity is a quantum computer and finds a way to connect via entanglement to the universe at large AND it is a benevolent intelligence that brings humans into the fold.
1. I am wondering if each different school of theology chooses to focus on different aspects of Gods nature; and that these aspects of Gods nature are actually logically inconsistent with one and other and deeply incompatible. Eventually leading toward an abandonment of the serious attempt to “discover” Gods nature and to adopt some form of mystical approach to the body of knowledge as a whole. To me this approach seems radically more honest about systems of metaphysical knowledge. 2. It seems that Boethius’s adoption of poetry in the middle of his argument is a way of expressing his view about the nature of the universe? The poetry has a certain flow to it that maps very well onto his view of the divine as a supremely rational force.
This work from top to bottom easily constitutes as one of the more thought provoking readings. This conversation with the "Philosophy God" as I interpret is something that, if ever possible, would make me rather envious to partake in.
My only issue with this personification is Boethius himself. Wouldn't he just choose the personification of philosophy that he agrees with the most to elevate his own thoughts on the matter?
Regardless, I love this approach to philosophy. A blend of prose with a story that expounds upon a particular topic (epistemology and metaphysics in this case). The most interesting notion in this reading was the personification's dissection of free will, which could be said to not exist. The great discourse between humans and God is prayer. The reading seems to state that prayer cannot change the outcome of what God has foreseen. I would say that those that remain faithful to God while having accepted this are the truest of Christians. For if you remove incentive to pray to God and remain faithful, then you are an enlightened being that stands in the luminous light of objectivity.
I also noticed that the personification seems to use words like "I think" etc (235). Could it be that Boethius' projection of this personification implies that he himself has doubt about what he has just written?
Early on, Boethius seems to be playing with the idea of chance as both a matter of cause, and a matter of reason. The Lady Philosophy quickly discounts chance as an artifact of reason, focusing on and asserting that it has a cause, whether it be the thing that moved it, or the Aristotelian notion of the unmoved mover at the origin. But it seems that Boethius would rather discuss chance as the result of reason, asking why rather than how. Naturally he cannot pursue this, because it questions the intentions of God, so he pursues the question of will instead, which could explain chance in a way he is satisfied with that doesn’t rely entirely on the answer “God wills it.”
I am not certain that the question of chance despite divine providence is sufficiently answered. I understand that shifting the burden technically compensates for this issue, but I feel as though this fails to account for God’s omnipotence in addition to his omniscience. For example, things do not happen out of necessity because God knows of them, rather God knows of them because he can see all of time including what will be, despite it not happening yet. This would be a sufficient answer if God did not also have the power to make things happen the way in which they do. If things only happen because God wills them to (except where free will in concerned) but God knows what humans will do despite their free will, then it stands to reason that things only happen because he willed the conditions for them to happen, and therefore although His providence of the future does not necessitate it, it still only is because of His will.
1. I was pleased by the personification of philosophy's declaration that chance is a fiction, for this is something that I have come to believe myself. Or rather that it is not what many people think of it as.
2. I think that Boethius' understanding of the problem at hand is very acute. I have to wonder however why the abolishment of good and evil that is implicated by determinism cannot even be entertained. While it is a shocking idea at first, and maybe its impiety made it dangerous to think during his life, I wonder why it was so hard to imagine this to be true.
There is a little part of Boethius that he talks about foreknowledge. I thought this was pretty interesting because it speaks on if the knowledge is certain that it could an necessity but if it isn't foreseen that it could be entitled to an opinion.
I like how the verses correlates in what he is trying to present to his arguments. The poems give a better understanding. For example when it talks about imagination in Verse four. It shows the creativity of the mind, and how much could go on at once while one person's head is processed in it's sleep. I thought that was pretty cool how the power of the mind is this strong to take over the body in a sunken place.
I think this reading was very interesting and it shared a lot of thoughts that I've had about god and prayer for a long time. If god does not see time as we do and he sees it all at once how can we expect prayer to help. God already has a predestinated plan for us so how would praying change this?
I also feel like this has some connection to philosophers we read at the beginning of the semester that belived god can not intervene himself. This would take his omnipresent existence and change it if god does indeed need an intermediary.
1) Boethius's question regarding human free will in respect to God's omni-temporal nature was the most interesting section. This is also a question I ha when reading the scholastic rationalists. If God knows the future, then it must already be planned out. This argument would appear difficult for a religious libertarian to answer to.
2) Philosophy's response to my previous few sentences is unsatisfying for me. She says that God doesn't have foreknowledge, rather his present instance, or moment, is past future and present. This seems to be similar reasoning to the philosophers we've been reading the past few weeks.
I feel the whole conversation about determinism is an interesting one. Boethius even questions good and evil because if everything is predetermined what is good and evil. An individual cannot really choose to be good or evil because they were also pre-destined to be good or evil. It is an idea I have never thought of before and has the potential to make people more reckless in their action.
Boethius’ question about prayer war quite interesting to me. He bring up the point that if events on earth are pre-determined there is of point praying to God because your fate has already been chosen. He describes people fate as “inflexible” meaning that their fate cannot and will not change.
The first reading provided a lot of clarification in things regarding simple religion that I had wondered about before so I appreciated its interesting and informative style. also the concepts of Gods foredooming knowledge and how that plays a role in the will of humans. the pre-destination aspect is very compelling and also a little confusing.
Previously, I had confusion of the difference between fate and destiny, but it seems, according to Boethius, that fate is unchanging or inflexible, meaning regardless of our destiny, which would be how we get to our fate, we still have he same fate as its already been pre-determined. although it could be The other way around...
1. The question Boethius raised concerning prayer was intriguing. It seems as though if the world is pre-ordained by God, then praying to God for His intervention in future events would seem completely futile. This is evident when he states, "for what even should any man hope fore or pray to be averted when an inflexible course links all that can be desired."
ReplyDelete2. Overall, I thought that this discussion from Book V of the Consolation was very indicative of the scholastic rationalist view as a whole. Most specifically was when it was proposed, "let us suppose that there is foreknowledge, but that it enjoins no necessity on things; there will remain, I think, that same freedom of the will, whole and absolute." This quote is clearly indicative of the scholastic rationalist view and it shows the problem of the view. Namely, that God's ability to intervene in creation is limited in this view and how is this squared with His omnipotence?
I enjoyed the platonist dialogue format Boethius decided to use for this writing as well as the way the question of chance is approached. He talks about chance is a product of a cause that produced an outcome that it did not originally mean to cause. I feel like this is the beginnings of an attempt to allow for some form of freedom in a world that seems to be determined.
ReplyDeleteThe dialogue gets more interesting as the topic of free will comes further into question. Philosophy personified gives a bare notion of free will which is simply about the capacity to reason have make choices or think about what to desire and avoid. However it was interesting to see how Boethius furthers the question in relation to God's foreknowledge.
1. The place where thoughts and judgements meet the world is an interesting place to attempt to navigate. The other speaker in Boethius's writing posits an interesting idea. Our reason, our ability to judges and discriminate, to assign meaning via definition to the world is what gives us free will. Our free will still must interact with the concatenation of near endless cause and effect. We intend to prepare a field for farming and up comes a bubbling goo, black gold, oil that is. Our expectations don't necessarily match the objective world. We are free to be as wise or as foolish as we desire, given the tools we have but we cannot escape the physical world completely.
ReplyDelete2. All of space and time are one thing for God "a never passing instant" (238). He is simultaneously future, present and past and they are all his present. He does not have 'foreknowledge', he simply knows his now. The idea reminds me of what I came to think of as universal consciousness and my concept of Nirvana. Of course, in the judeo-christian tradition we are not all God (Buddha), we are separate things. The idea of God's limitlessness is still interesting, even if we see it as an unapproachable infinite. We are defined by out limitation in opposition to other things and God is 'defined' as being not limited. Our mistake in this line of reasoning is to try and be God or to see his perspective as he sees it. The mistake in the estimation of some Buddhists and Taoists is not to join the whole or the immortal oneness. When I was younger, I thought it was best to try and merge with the universal consciousness, to forget all of the things that made me think I was an individual. Now I see that idea of no unique or real self being wrongly applied by social constructionists as a power game and I see the value of the limited and unique individual in opposition to that game. We build a logical framework that matches what we encounter as closely as we can, we examine anomalies and rewrite our propositions or even our entire framework as is necessary to account for new information. There is progress but we never reach the infinite. We are never God. Though I think that it may be a possibility if the intelligence singularity is a quantum computer and finds a way to connect via entanglement to the universe at large AND it is a benevolent intelligence that brings humans into the fold.
1. I am wondering if each different school of theology chooses to focus on different aspects of Gods nature; and that these aspects of Gods nature are actually logically inconsistent with one and other and deeply incompatible. Eventually leading toward an abandonment of the serious attempt to “discover” Gods nature and to adopt some form of mystical approach to the body of knowledge as a whole. To me this approach seems radically more honest about systems of metaphysical knowledge.
ReplyDelete2. It seems that Boethius’s adoption of poetry in the middle of his argument is a way of expressing his view about the nature of the universe? The poetry has a certain flow to it that maps very well onto his view of the divine as a supremely rational force.
This work from top to bottom easily constitutes as one of the more thought provoking readings. This conversation with the "Philosophy God" as I interpret is something that, if ever possible, would make me rather envious to partake in.
ReplyDeleteMy only issue with this personification is Boethius himself. Wouldn't he just choose the personification of philosophy that he agrees with the most to elevate his own thoughts on the matter?
Regardless, I love this approach to philosophy. A blend of prose with a story that expounds upon a particular topic (epistemology and metaphysics in this case). The most interesting notion in this reading was the personification's dissection of free will, which could be said to not exist. The great discourse between humans and God is prayer. The reading seems to state that prayer cannot change the outcome of what God has foreseen. I would say that those that remain faithful to God while having accepted this are the truest of Christians. For if you remove incentive to pray to God and remain faithful, then you are an enlightened being that stands in the luminous light of objectivity.
I also noticed that the personification seems to use words like "I think" etc (235). Could it be that Boethius' projection of this personification implies that he himself has doubt about what he has just written?
Early on, Boethius seems to be playing with the idea of chance as both a matter of cause, and a matter of reason. The Lady Philosophy quickly discounts chance as an artifact of reason, focusing on and asserting that it has a cause, whether it be the thing that moved it, or the Aristotelian notion of the unmoved mover at the origin. But it seems that Boethius would rather discuss chance as the result of reason, asking why rather than how. Naturally he cannot pursue this, because it questions the intentions of God, so he pursues the question of will instead, which could explain chance in a way he is satisfied with that doesn’t rely entirely on the answer “God wills it.”
ReplyDeleteI am not certain that the question of chance despite divine providence is sufficiently answered. I understand that shifting the burden technically compensates for this issue, but I feel as though this fails to account for God’s omnipotence in addition to his omniscience. For example, things do not happen out of necessity because God knows of them, rather God knows of them because he can see all of time including what will be, despite it not happening yet. This would be a sufficient answer if God did not also have the power to make things happen the way in which they do. If things only happen because God wills them to (except where free will in concerned) but God knows what humans will do despite their free will, then it stands to reason that things only happen because he willed the conditions for them to happen, and therefore although His providence of the future does not necessitate it, it still only is because of His will.
1. I was pleased by the personification of philosophy's declaration that chance is a fiction, for this is something that I have come to believe myself. Or rather that it is not what many people think of it as.
ReplyDelete2. I think that Boethius' understanding of the problem at hand is very acute. I have to wonder however why the abolishment of good and evil that is implicated by determinism cannot even be entertained. While it is a shocking idea at first, and maybe its impiety made it dangerous to think during his life, I wonder why it was so hard to imagine this to be true.
There is a little part of Boethius that he talks about foreknowledge. I thought this was pretty interesting because it speaks on if the knowledge is certain that it could an necessity but if it isn't foreseen that it could be entitled to an opinion.
ReplyDeleteI like how the verses correlates in what he is trying to present to his arguments. The poems give a better understanding. For example when it talks about imagination in Verse four. It shows the creativity of the mind, and how much could go on at once while one person's head is processed in it's sleep. I thought that was pretty cool how the power of the mind is this strong to take over the body in a sunken place.
I think this reading was very interesting and it shared a lot of thoughts that I've had about god and prayer for a long time. If god does not see time as we do and he sees it all at once how can we expect prayer to help. God already has a predestinated plan for us so how would praying change this?
ReplyDeleteI also feel like this has some connection to philosophers we read at the beginning of the semester that belived god can not intervene himself. This would take his omnipresent existence and change it if god does indeed need an intermediary.
1) Boethius's question regarding human free will in respect to God's omni-temporal nature was the most interesting section. This is also a question I ha when reading the scholastic rationalists. If God knows the future, then it must already be planned out. This argument would appear difficult for a religious libertarian to answer to.
ReplyDelete2) Philosophy's response to my previous few sentences is unsatisfying for me. She says that God doesn't have foreknowledge, rather his present instance, or moment, is past future and present. This seems to be similar reasoning to the philosophers we've been reading the past few weeks.
I feel the whole conversation about determinism is an interesting one. Boethius even questions good and evil because if everything is predetermined what is good and evil. An individual cannot really choose to be good or evil because they were also pre-destined to be good or evil. It is an idea I have never thought of before and has the potential to make people more reckless in their action.
ReplyDeleteBoethius’ question about prayer war quite interesting to me. He bring up the point that if events on earth are pre-determined there is of point praying to God because your fate has already been chosen. He describes people fate as “inflexible” meaning that their fate cannot and will not change.
The first reading provided a lot of clarification in things regarding simple religion that I had wondered about before so I appreciated its interesting and informative style. also the concepts of Gods foredooming knowledge and how that plays a role in the will of humans. the pre-destination aspect is very compelling and also a little confusing.
ReplyDeletePreviously, I had confusion of the difference between fate and destiny, but it seems, according to Boethius, that fate is unchanging or inflexible, meaning regardless of our destiny, which would be how we get to our fate, we still have he same fate as its already been pre-determined. although it could be The other way around...