1. The way St. Anselm begins his discussion is interesting but I don't think it has me convinced. He seems to be making the claim that God's foreknowledge, rather than eliminating the possibility of free-will, instead actually secures its possibility. He seems to just accept the assumption that actions occur without necessity instead of proving this assumption. And then he uses this accepted assumption to prove that free-will and foreknowledge are compatible when he states, "For, on the one hand, it is necessary that what is foreknown by God be going to occur; and on the other hand, God foreknows that something is going to occur without any necessity" (240).
2. He then takes this argument and attaches it to human's ability to sin or not to sin. I still have a problem with the argument here as well because he seems to be taking the same (unproven) assumption that he used to prove the compatibility between free-will and foreknowledge to explain the compatibility between human's free-will to sin and God's foreknowledge of whether they sin or not. He makes this claim when he states, "And thus it follows that whether you sin or do not sin, in either case it will be without necessity; for God foreknows that what will occur will occur without necessity" (240).
1. Anselm claims that necessity is something that does not apply to events which God has foreknowledge of. He addresses concerns with his argument that, to me, seem secondary in contrast to creating a new definition of foreknowledge. He writes first to assuage a possible concern that foreknowledge implies that we are compelled by some force to act in a certain way. He states that just because a thing is going to happen, it does not follow that it did not happen voluntarily. While this is an interesting response, the real problem is the redefinition of foreknowledge with respect to God. I find the argument that God is in all of time simultaneously a better argument for God's foreknowledge not resulting in a predetermined world. Though there is choice there is a world that would be known only to any being that is not limited by space and time. Such a being would not only be unchangeable but what impetus would it have to change? Its now is all. There is nothing to avoid and nothing to move towards.
2. The whole conundrum seems to rest on the difference between the experiences of a creature who exists as a limited being (in space and time) and the imagination of such a being applied to the nature of the existence of an unlimited being. I heard someone say (Iain McGilchrist I think) that limitation is necessary for being. There must be an other, an 'opposition'. The differences between such a being and one for which there is no other (time, space, possibility to being) are unimaginable and bound to create contradictions in a limited reference. I think that is why Lao Tzu said that the Tao that can be named is not the eternal name and why Buddha sat in silence.
When I have thought about the issue of free will and God's foreknowledge Anselm brings to mind the exact solution I always thought about however he expounds on it even more. Anselm states that foreknowledge is not incompatible with free will in the sense that he posits it to be possible that God can know something will happen unnecessarily. It is interesting how Anselm makes the distinction between God knowing something and it happening necessarily. In other words the action being different would change God's foreknowledge of the event.
I also found it interesting how Anselm uses strict logic for his position by stating that if there arises no logical possibility from the idea that God can know something unnecessary will happen, therefore there is no incompatibility between the existence of foreknowledge and free will. Another way he gets around this issue is through defining the term necessary to mean that nothing is preventing something. For example, even if you were going to do something if there was no force preventing you from doing doing something else, your action was not necessary. likewise God's foreknowledge of an event creates no force upon someone or something for it to happen, which, according to Anselm, means it was not a necessary action.
So, necessity has no bearing on the foreknowledge of God.God knows something will occur without the act having necessity itself. For God to exist and also lack foreknowledge would seem rather pedestrian. Also, Anselm implies that necessity follows the act itself, rather than the opposite. This would mean that the nature of act and necessity is not linear, but perhaps circular. He also goes to great lengths to separate their propensity to occur because the other has taken place (i.e. and act absent of necessity can still occur). Also, necessity alone does not predict the act happening.
Although it isn't explicitly stated, Anselm seems to associate God's will with human free will rather than human free will with necessity. As he continues, necessity seems less and less relevant to understanding the dichotomy of free will and determinism. I also get the impression that Anselm thinks of human free will as fickle, unlike the nature of God's will - consistent and certain.
1. The way St. Anselm begins his discussion is interesting but I don't think it has me convinced. He seems to be making the claim that God's foreknowledge, rather than eliminating the possibility of free-will, instead actually secures its possibility. He seems to just accept the assumption that actions occur without necessity instead of proving this assumption. And then he uses this accepted assumption to prove that free-will and foreknowledge are compatible when he states, "For, on the one hand, it is necessary that what is foreknown by God be going to occur; and on the other hand, God foreknows that something is going to occur without any necessity" (240).
ReplyDelete2. He then takes this argument and attaches it to human's ability to sin or not to sin. I still have a problem with the argument here as well because he seems to be taking the same (unproven) assumption that he used to prove the compatibility between free-will and foreknowledge to explain the compatibility between human's free-will to sin and God's foreknowledge of whether they sin or not. He makes this claim when he states, "And thus it follows that whether you sin or do not sin, in either case it will be without necessity; for God foreknows that what will occur will occur without necessity" (240).
1. Anselm claims that necessity is something that does not apply to events which God has foreknowledge of. He addresses concerns with his argument that, to me, seem secondary in contrast to creating a new definition of foreknowledge. He writes first to assuage a possible concern that foreknowledge implies that we are compelled by some force to act in a certain way. He states that just because a thing is going to happen, it does not follow that it did not happen voluntarily. While this is an interesting response, the real problem is the redefinition of foreknowledge with respect to God. I find the argument that God is in all of time simultaneously a better argument for God's foreknowledge not resulting in a predetermined world. Though there is choice there is a world that would be known only to any being that is not limited by space and time. Such a being would not only be unchangeable but what impetus would it have to change? Its now is all. There is nothing to avoid and nothing to move towards.
ReplyDelete2. The whole conundrum seems to rest on the difference between the experiences of a creature who exists as a limited being (in space and time) and the imagination of such a being applied to the nature of the existence of an unlimited being. I heard someone say (Iain McGilchrist I think) that limitation is necessary for being. There must be an other, an 'opposition'. The differences between such a being and one for which there is no other (time, space, possibility to being) are unimaginable and bound to create contradictions in a limited reference. I think that is why Lao Tzu said that the Tao that can be named is not the eternal name and why Buddha sat in silence.
When I have thought about the issue of free will and God's foreknowledge Anselm brings to mind the exact solution I always thought about however he expounds on it even more. Anselm states that foreknowledge is not incompatible with free will in the sense that he posits it to be possible that God can know something will happen unnecessarily. It is interesting how Anselm makes the distinction between God knowing something and it happening necessarily. In other words the action being different would change God's foreknowledge of the event.
ReplyDeleteI also found it interesting how Anselm uses strict logic for his position by stating that if there arises no logical possibility from the idea that God can know something unnecessary will happen, therefore there is no incompatibility between the existence of foreknowledge and free will. Another way he gets around this issue is through defining the term necessary to mean that nothing is preventing something. For example, even if you were going to do something if there was no force preventing you from doing doing something else, your action was not necessary. likewise God's foreknowledge of an event creates no force upon someone or something for it to happen, which, according to Anselm, means it was not a necessary action.
So, necessity has no bearing on the foreknowledge of God.God knows something will occur without the act having necessity itself. For God to exist and also lack foreknowledge would seem rather pedestrian. Also, Anselm implies that necessity follows the act itself, rather than the opposite. This would mean that the nature of act and necessity is not linear, but perhaps circular. He also goes to great lengths to separate their propensity to occur because the other has taken place (i.e. and act absent of necessity can still occur). Also, necessity alone does not predict the act happening.
ReplyDeleteAlthough it isn't explicitly stated, Anselm seems to associate God's will with human free will rather than human free will with necessity. As he continues, necessity seems less and less relevant to understanding the dichotomy of free will and determinism. I also get the impression that Anselm thinks of human free will as fickle, unlike the nature of God's will - consistent and certain.