I am having trouble understanding the distinction between the three types of universals Avicenna mentions in the beginning of his writings. 1 and 2 seems to be distinguished by 1 having a concrete referent while 2 can have a non-concrete referent, meaning it doesn't need to refer to an existing thing. Is this the correct difference? 3 is more difficult for me to grasp initially.
it is interesting to see how Siger of Brabant is trying to refute Plato's view of universals if my interpretation is correct. He makes a good point by stating that there is difference in matter and also replies to the idea of God making multiples of one person being contradictory. It also seems however that he refutes Aristotle by claiming that natures or forms can exist apart from concrete things.
1. The use of the term 'species' in Siger's writing is confusing. I think he is talking about individuals but it also seems like he is saying that Humans are a species. If so, is he saying that there is only one 'intellective soul'? He states that philosophers have argued that "if the intellective soul enjoys being which is separated from matter then it exists apart from any principle that causes difference and number and multiplication of individuals within a species"(203). That seems so obviously wrong that I must either be misreading it or misunderstanding some crucial term. I think the intellective should is meant to mean the mind. Maybe it is a collective sort of Hegelian mind. If so, I could see there only being one per species. If not, the concept sounds like a bit of mental gymnastics that ends with a broken spine. The modern notion of the mind (at least that of the layperson) seems to be that the mind is a result of the hardware and 'software' of the brain. We each receive, we each interpret and we each develop a framework to continue existing for as long as we can and perhaps reproduce; in hopes of extending our life or legacy in some way. Again, I am not sure if the seemingly strange idea Siger is attributing to philosophers is one that arises from an antiquated notion of an eternal soul or if it is some other interplay of ideas that I am just not seeing.
2.There is an interesting interplay between the universal and the specific in Ibn Sina's writing. I find it easier to swallow a version of universals that does not require that I imagine a fairytale land where all the most perfectest of each form resides in absolute and eternal beauty. It still seems like it is mostly a language game, by which I mean a necessary set of relationships in description of shared traits. Though each thing is unique and may not even be a thing at all, we need to be able to communicate with other limited intelligent beings in a limited and intelligible manner. Ibn Sina's example of the Sun not referring to many or being a universal is a good example of what can occur in language when we are limited by our knowledge of space, time and whatever other dimensions exist. There are many suns that share a very large number of traits with ours in their 'Sunness'.
1.) The work of Avicenna is easily some of my favorite of the philosophical works that were constructed post-antiquity. Well I’m not really going to go ahead and buy what Avicenna is selling here in the big picture I find his work making the distinction between the essence of something and it’s existence to ba an incredibly useful linguistic advancement! 2.) I hope that I am correct in reading Siger as saying that he finds the idea of a single soul an absurd notion. Again I can’t say that I will ever find any metaphysical argument particularly convincing from my limited view existing as I do in this temporal and special place with the social and philosophical conditioning I have had in my life. Although a Buddhist conception of the one soul may be a nuance that could counter the certainty of Siger when it comes to this notion. I find both possibilities equally unknowable.
1. The way Siger of Brabant argues for one collective nature among human species sounds very platonic. He states that among men there is but one nature, no matter the quantity of man. This is because man is of the one form and as such they share one universal nature. However, between man and donkey there are two natures, one of the form of the man, and one for the form of the donkey. Although this too does not matter on the quantity of men or donkeys because they each belong to their own single separate form.
2. It was weird to me that Siger states that "God cannot make that which is self-contradictory and repugnant. In like manner, God cannot produce many men, each of whom would be Socrates" (204). The reason I find this odd is because I thought that it would be heresy to say that man could reason what God could not do simply because man finds it to be "repugnant" or "contradictory" to man's limited reasoning. Wouldn't it make more sense to state something like, although God can do x, He chooses not to do x for reason y?
I find it interesting how Avicenna breaks up "genus" into two categories: logical genus and natural genus. Acknowledging this difference really ties up some of the loose ends of the philosophers of previous readings whom took the linguistic approach. Avicenna's account allows for the ambiguity of creatures to have a physical and variant form whilst still maintaining permanence of the form to which they belong. I also take issue with Siger's use of "God cannot" because it implies that it is outside of His capabilities. I understand that by Siger's decree God is an entity of logic and to do something illogical would go against His nature, however it is puzzling to me how God is unable to replicate the intellective soul. If God is continuous and God possesses the capabilities to make something countably finite, how is it that He is unable to do so? And does this imply that there are a such thing as "empty vessels" out there in coexistence with humans, who only take on the physical form?
More than usual I had trouble following Avicenna. He seems to be elaborating on an Aristotelian moderate realism, but I’m not sure I follow how the distinction he is trying to make is in any way novel or unique. His explanation of understanding universals in different ways or modes feels like a consistently used approach. Furthermore, I don’t thing realism is the best course of action to address the ambiguity surrounding universals.
Regarding Siger, I found him easier to read, although he too is supporting a realism. I think his definitions to distinguish the use of a word as a universal and the use referring to an individual, but because he supports a realism, the interpretation of the physical manifestation of the universal is more important than the linguistic use. I think I differ in opinion because I can’t seem to accept realism as superior interpretation of universals to either nominalism or conceptualism.
There are obvious limitations and constraints that burden the philosophy of language at this particular time in history. Language is concrete enough insofar as there is agreement among those using it. Avicenna adds many layers to this conversation that seem to be beyond him. He is Darwin before Darwin with his attempt to categorize things. Ultimately, I failed to grasp the nuances of the reading. Logical vs. natural genus?
Now, I have always found metaphysics to be the weakest branch of philosophy. However, I cannot deny its interesting range of topics, including this reading. His idea of a soul as a species seems to be different from our understanding today. Regardless, this interesting to speculate about. This reading seems to raise more questions that it solves. Avicenna does a great job at mitigating the possibilities of both sides (i.e. does the soul actually rely on the body or vice versa?).
SIgers argument for one human nature seems not correct to me. As humans we have many different dispositions and to say we meet one form is absurd to me. We can look at cases of saints compared to serial killers. This shows the wide spread inate nature of humans.
I think making man into one form of human nature takes away a lot of free will that we talked about in the last paper. It would seem to guide that all humans are needed to act simulary.
1. I had a hard time paying attention to this reading. I didn't note any flaws in what Avicenna was saying. It seems though as if the things that he is written aren't really things that can be disagreed with or things that we didn't already know.
2. Although it was hard for me to see what Siger of Brabant was getting at with the commonness of the intellective soul, I came to see it when I thought about the nature of the intellect. It's hard for me to determine exactly what the intellect is however.
Avicenna idea of universals having three sense is interesting to me. The senses are an item being a universal based on being predicated of many items, the ability to be predicated from many items and the possibility of being predicated from many items. Essentially it seems to me that Avicenna considers any object that an individual can think of being made from many parts as a universal. I have never heard the concept of universals be explained in that way.
Siger arguing against Plato’s concept of universals was an interesting one to me. He explains his argument by stating that there is a difference in matter. His point about the ability of nature’s forms existing separately from solid things is an interesting one. His overall outlook on this matter mirrors that of an early philosopher we read about.
I am having trouble understanding the distinction between the three types of universals Avicenna mentions in the beginning of his writings. 1 and 2 seems to be distinguished by 1 having a concrete referent while 2 can have a non-concrete referent, meaning it doesn't need to refer to an existing thing. Is this the correct difference? 3 is more difficult for me to grasp initially.
ReplyDeleteit is interesting to see how Siger of Brabant is trying to refute Plato's view of universals if my interpretation is correct. He makes a good point by stating that there is difference in matter and also replies to the idea of God making multiples of one person being contradictory. It also seems however that he refutes Aristotle by claiming that natures or forms can exist apart from concrete things.
1. The use of the term 'species' in Siger's writing is confusing. I think he is talking about individuals but it also seems like he is saying that Humans are a species. If so, is he saying that there is only one 'intellective soul'? He states that philosophers have argued that "if the intellective soul enjoys being which is separated from matter then it exists apart from any principle that causes difference and number and multiplication of individuals within a species"(203). That seems so obviously wrong that I must either be misreading it or misunderstanding some crucial term. I think the intellective should is meant to mean the mind. Maybe it is a collective sort of Hegelian mind. If so, I could see there only being one per species. If not, the concept sounds like a bit of mental gymnastics that ends with a broken spine. The modern notion of the mind (at least that of the layperson) seems to be that the mind is a result of the hardware and 'software' of the brain. We each receive, we each interpret and we each develop a framework to continue existing for as long as we can and perhaps reproduce; in hopes of extending our life or legacy in some way. Again, I am not sure if the seemingly strange idea Siger is attributing to philosophers is one that arises from an antiquated notion of an eternal soul or if it is some other interplay of ideas that I am just not seeing.
ReplyDelete2.There is an interesting interplay between the universal and the specific in Ibn Sina's writing. I find it easier to swallow a version of universals that does not require that I imagine a fairytale land where all the most perfectest of each form resides in absolute and eternal beauty. It still seems like it is mostly a language game, by which I mean a necessary set of relationships in description of shared traits. Though each thing is unique and may not even be a thing at all, we need to be able to communicate with other limited intelligent beings in a limited and intelligible manner. Ibn Sina's example of the Sun not referring to many or being a universal is a good example of what can occur in language when we are limited by our knowledge of space, time and whatever other dimensions exist. There are many suns that share a very large number of traits with ours in their 'Sunness'.
1.) The work of Avicenna is easily some of my favorite of the philosophical works that were constructed post-antiquity. Well I’m not really going to go ahead and buy what Avicenna is selling here in the big picture I find his work making the distinction between the essence of something and it’s existence to ba an incredibly useful linguistic advancement!
ReplyDelete2.) I hope that I am correct in reading Siger as saying that he finds the idea of a single soul an absurd notion. Again I can’t say that I will ever find any metaphysical argument particularly convincing from my limited view existing as I do in this temporal and special place with the social and philosophical conditioning I have had in my life. Although a Buddhist conception of the one soul may be a nuance that could counter the certainty of Siger when it comes to this notion. I find both possibilities equally unknowable.
1. The way Siger of Brabant argues for one collective nature among human species sounds very platonic. He states that among men there is but one nature, no matter the quantity of man. This is because man is of the one form and as such they share one universal nature. However, between man and donkey there are two natures, one of the form of the man, and one for the form of the donkey. Although this too does not matter on the quantity of men or donkeys because they each belong to their own single separate form.
ReplyDelete2. It was weird to me that Siger states that "God cannot make that which is self-contradictory and repugnant. In like manner, God cannot produce many men, each of whom would be Socrates" (204). The reason I find this odd is because I thought that it would be heresy to say that man could reason what God could not do simply because man finds it to be "repugnant" or "contradictory" to man's limited reasoning. Wouldn't it make more sense to state something like, although God can do x, He chooses not to do x for reason y?
I find it interesting how Avicenna breaks up "genus" into two categories: logical genus and natural genus. Acknowledging this difference really ties up some of the loose ends of the philosophers of previous readings whom took the linguistic approach. Avicenna's account allows for the ambiguity of creatures to have a physical and variant form whilst still maintaining permanence of the form to which they belong.
ReplyDeleteI also take issue with Siger's use of "God cannot" because it implies that it is outside of His capabilities. I understand that by Siger's decree God is an entity of logic and to do something illogical would go against His nature, however it is puzzling to me how God is unable to replicate the intellective soul. If God is continuous and God possesses the capabilities to make something countably finite, how is it that He is unable to do so? And does this imply that there are a such thing as "empty vessels" out there in coexistence with humans, who only take on the physical form?
More than usual I had trouble following Avicenna. He seems to be elaborating on an Aristotelian moderate realism, but I’m not sure I follow how the distinction he is trying to make is in any way novel or unique. His explanation of understanding universals in different ways or modes feels like a consistently used approach. Furthermore, I don’t thing realism is the best course of action to address the ambiguity surrounding universals.
ReplyDeleteRegarding Siger, I found him easier to read, although he too is supporting a realism. I think his definitions to distinguish the use of a word as a universal and the use referring to an individual, but because he supports a realism, the interpretation of the physical manifestation of the universal is more important than the linguistic use. I think I differ in opinion because I can’t seem to accept realism as superior interpretation of universals to either nominalism or conceptualism.
There are obvious limitations and constraints that burden the philosophy of language at this particular time in history. Language is concrete enough insofar as there is agreement among those using it. Avicenna adds many layers to this conversation that seem to be beyond him. He is Darwin before Darwin with his attempt to categorize things. Ultimately, I failed to grasp the nuances of the reading. Logical vs. natural genus?
ReplyDeleteNow, I have always found metaphysics to be the weakest branch of philosophy. However, I cannot deny its interesting range of topics, including this reading. His idea of a soul as a species seems to be different from our understanding today. Regardless, this interesting to speculate about. This reading seems to raise more questions that it solves. Avicenna does a great job at mitigating the possibilities of both sides (i.e. does the soul actually rely on the body or vice versa?).
SIgers argument for one human nature seems not correct to me. As humans we have many different dispositions and to say we meet one form is absurd to me. We can look at cases of saints compared to serial killers. This shows the wide spread inate nature of humans.
ReplyDeleteI think making man into one form of human nature takes away a lot of free will that we talked about in the last paper. It would seem to guide that all humans are needed to act simulary.
1. I had a hard time paying attention to this reading. I didn't note any flaws in what Avicenna was saying. It seems though as if the things that he is written aren't really things that can be disagreed with or things that we didn't already know.
ReplyDelete2. Although it was hard for me to see what Siger of Brabant was getting at with the commonness of the intellective soul, I came to see it when I thought about the nature of the intellect. It's hard for me to determine exactly what the intellect is however.
Avicenna idea of universals having three sense is interesting to me. The senses are an item being a universal based on being predicated of many items, the ability to be predicated from many items and the possibility of being predicated from many items. Essentially it seems to me that Avicenna considers any object that an individual can think of being made from many parts as a universal. I have never heard the concept of universals be explained in that way.
ReplyDeleteSiger arguing against Plato’s concept of universals was an interesting one to me. He explains his argument by stating that there is a difference in matter. His point about the ability of nature’s forms existing separately from solid things is an interesting one. His overall outlook on this matter mirrors that of an early philosopher we read about.