1. Of all the philosophers we have read thus far in class I feel as though Scotus has been the hardest for me to grasp. That being said, what I think he is getting at here is that "unity" and "singularity" are both real and existing in universals. Scotus states, taking from Aristotle, that universals are real and measurable by one. Therefore, unity amongst particulars that causes the universal must be real because something that is real, the primary, can only be measured by some unit that is real i.e. its unity.
2. Further, Scotus makes the distinction that the unity is not caused by a multiplicity in one item because the unity is "through ranking how in every genus that to which the chaser of measuring belongs is one" (374). Therefore, since the universality in things is not due to their multiplicity, but instead due to their character, "the unity is not numerical because there is no singular in a genus which is the measure of all the items in that genus" (374).
1) Scotus is still difficult for me to understand. In the first section, he seems to be arguing that beings are individuals in relation to their soul. I was left wondering if that means that Scotus believes that physically we are one apart fron our accidental traits. 2) In section 8.3, Scotus is reviewing the arguments of Plato and Aristotle regarding universals as a common nature. It appears that Scotus is arguing that universals are common but they aren't one in number. Rather they translate into different realities in seperate beings.
1. I'm having trouble understanding Scotus in this first section particularly. From the little I can grasp it seems as though he is arguing against Aristotle that things can have their own natures not shared by other because then multiplicity would be a contradiction. I'm having trouble also understanding what he means when he mentions that things would reject their opposites if everything had a singular nature.
1. I am very confused as to what scotus means by numerical unity. Does he mean this in some kind of a platonic context or does he mean it in an Aristotelian one? Never the less through a lot of the metaphysical confusion l I found some parts of this to be preticularly profound and this quote specifically reminded me of Deluze, “Therefore, to any unity corresponds it’s own peculiar diversity” (375).
2. I also find his ideas about the diversity of ideas sorounding individuation to be particularly fascinating. Does he believe that the existence and essence of a thing are more closely linked than form and matter, or do they hold the same kind of distance?
As I’ve come to expect, Scotus reminds me how underdeveloped my argumentative skills are and how sophisticated and technical medieval philosophy can be. One point that caught my attention was when Scotus used scientific knowledge as an example of the subject preceding The idea of itself. This would suggest that universals existing only in the mind is as impossible as Aristotle’s notion that they existed only in concrete objects. If someone has not thought of it, or observed it, could it be that it does not exist? It reminds me of a discussion I had with a professor years ago about whether Calculus, whether it was Leibniz or Newton, was invented or discovered. It didn’t occur to me at the time how large and old of a question that was.
Another thing I took note of was Scotus’s use of unity to describe both “real unity” and “numerical unity.” When he talks about real unity, he seems to be referring to something closer to the genus, or other group to which something belongs. But numerical unity appears to refer to each thing being the (one) thing which it is. So I, as myself, am the only one, so the unity in this regard is numerical, but as a man, or human, or mammal, etc. there is another way to regard unity that Scotus calls real unity. This reminds me of another argument we discussed some weeks ago where we considered that universals are only the words used to meaningfully group together distinct things.
An idea Scoutus presented that I found very interesting was one concerning the idea that universals exist only in the mind. However, like the argument made by Aristotle about universals existing in only physical objects it is flawed. If no one has seen a universal or conceived it even possible that they exist at all.
The idea numerical unity is an idea that caught my attention yet was very difficult to understand. What I managed to gain from the idea of numerical unity is that it has to do with everything being the one thing that it is. Even though I do not fully understand the meaning of this I can somewhat make sense of matter on earth representing only one thing.
I also find Scotus to be difficult to read, however I do find the reading enticing. Especially when he goes on about how the cardinality of common nature. I find it very interesting in Scotus' proposal, that nature is not numerically singular. Ascribing a numerical unity to nature would be problematic, as he later shows, because break down the distinction among universals versus particulars. He uses genus as to exemplify his claim; "no singular in a genus is the measure of all the items in that genus." Thus, nature cannot be singular and is a sort of composed unity.
This Scotus reading was by far the most technical and convincing piece I think i've read for this class yet. It certainly helps that we are no longer discussing God directly. Scotus’ attack and examination of much of Plato comes from a place of logic, as much of medieval philosophy does. But I couldn't detect even hint of judeo-christianity blocking his vision(not until the very end that is). On top of that he made a number of arguments that I found quite interesting. For instance his discussion of things existence outside of our thought or observation he comes close to saying the famous idioms we all know today. If a tree falls in the woods and nobody is there to hear it, does it make a sound? I didn't really care for the argument but the history made me chuckle. That being said this reading was far from pleasant. It was long and hard which made i hard for me to get exactly where scotus falls in this debate of universals. He is a conceptualist that much is clear, but I had a hard time working out the specifics. He agrees and disagrees with aristotle that universals exist but only in material things. He seems to have some sort of relational view of universals. That they exist in the thing insofar as it has a relation with a knower.
1. Of all the philosophers we have read thus far in class I feel as though Scotus has been the hardest for me to grasp. That being said, what I think he is getting at here is that "unity" and "singularity" are both real and existing in universals. Scotus states, taking from Aristotle, that universals are real and measurable by one. Therefore, unity amongst particulars that causes the universal must be real because something that is real, the primary, can only be measured by some unit that is real i.e. its unity.
ReplyDelete2. Further, Scotus makes the distinction that the unity is not caused by a multiplicity in one item because the unity is "through ranking how in every genus that to which the chaser of measuring belongs is one" (374). Therefore, since the universality in things is not due to their multiplicity, but instead due to their character, "the unity is not numerical because there is no singular in a genus which is the measure of all the items in that genus" (374).
1) Scotus is still difficult for me to understand. In the first section, he seems to be arguing that beings are individuals in relation to their soul. I was left wondering if that means that Scotus believes that physically we are one apart fron our accidental traits.
ReplyDelete2) In section 8.3, Scotus is reviewing the arguments of Plato and Aristotle regarding universals as a common nature. It appears that Scotus is arguing that universals are common but they aren't one in number. Rather they translate into different realities in seperate beings.
1. I'm having trouble understanding Scotus in this first section particularly. From the little I can grasp it seems as though he is arguing against Aristotle that things can have their own natures not shared by other because then multiplicity would be a contradiction. I'm having trouble also understanding what he means when he mentions that things would reject their opposites if everything had a singular nature.
ReplyDelete1. I am very confused as to what scotus means by numerical unity. Does he mean this in some kind of a platonic context or does he mean it in an Aristotelian one? Never the less through a lot of the metaphysical confusion l I found some parts of this to be preticularly profound and this quote specifically reminded me of Deluze, “Therefore, to any unity corresponds it’s own peculiar diversity” (375).
ReplyDelete2. I also find his ideas about the diversity of ideas sorounding individuation to be particularly fascinating. Does he believe that the existence and essence of a thing are more closely linked than form and matter, or do they hold the same kind of distance?
As I’ve come to expect, Scotus reminds me how underdeveloped my argumentative skills are and how sophisticated and technical medieval philosophy can be. One point that caught my attention was when Scotus used scientific knowledge as an example of the subject preceding
ReplyDeleteThe idea of itself. This would suggest that universals existing only in the mind is as impossible as Aristotle’s notion that they existed only in concrete objects. If someone has not thought of it, or observed it, could it be that it does not exist? It reminds me of a discussion I had with a professor years ago about whether Calculus, whether it was Leibniz or Newton, was invented or discovered. It didn’t occur to me at the time how large and old of a question that was.
Another thing I took note of was Scotus’s use of unity to describe both “real unity” and “numerical unity.” When he talks about real unity, he seems to be referring to something closer to the genus, or other group to which something belongs. But numerical unity appears to refer to each thing being the (one) thing which it is. So I, as myself, am the only one, so the unity in this regard is numerical, but as a man, or human, or mammal, etc. there is another way to regard unity that Scotus calls real unity. This reminds me of another argument we discussed some weeks ago where we considered that universals are only the words used to meaningfully group together distinct things.
Christopher Atuahene
ReplyDeleteAn idea Scoutus presented that I found very interesting was one concerning the idea that universals exist only in the mind. However, like the argument made by Aristotle about universals existing in only physical objects it is flawed. If no one has seen a universal or conceived it even possible that they exist at all.
The idea numerical unity is an idea that caught my attention yet was very difficult to understand. What I managed to gain from the idea of numerical unity is that it has to do with everything being the one thing that it is. Even though I do not fully understand the meaning of this I can somewhat make sense of matter on earth representing only one thing.
I also find Scotus to be difficult to read, however I do find the reading enticing. Especially when he goes on about how the cardinality of common nature.
ReplyDeleteI find it very interesting in Scotus' proposal, that nature is not numerically singular. Ascribing a numerical unity to nature would be problematic, as he later shows, because break down the distinction among universals versus particulars. He uses genus as to exemplify his claim; "no singular in a genus is the measure of all the items in that genus." Thus, nature cannot be singular and is a sort of composed unity.
This Scotus reading was by far the most technical and convincing piece I think i've read for this class yet. It certainly helps that we are no longer discussing God directly. Scotus’ attack and examination of much of Plato comes from a place of logic, as much of medieval philosophy does. But I couldn't detect even hint of judeo-christianity blocking his vision(not until the very end that is). On top of that he made a number of arguments that I found quite interesting. For instance his discussion of things existence outside of our thought or observation he comes close to saying the famous idioms we all know today. If a tree falls in the woods and nobody is there to hear it, does it make a sound? I didn't really care for the argument but the history made me chuckle.
ReplyDeleteThat being said this reading was far from pleasant. It was long and hard which made i hard for me to get exactly where scotus falls in this debate of universals. He is a conceptualist that much is clear, but I had a hard time working out the specifics. He agrees and disagrees with aristotle that universals exist but only in material things. He seems to have some sort of relational view of universals. That they exist in the thing insofar as it has a relation with a knower.