1. The idea that forms don't actually exist as objects in the real world seems obvious from a modern perspective. We know more about the computer housed in our skulls then the medieval philosophers. Though I hope I am wrong, the mind is very likely not eternal and separate from the body and neither are the forms. What is more interesting and, for me, unexpected is when Ockham posits that forms have an objective existence within the soul (mind). This concept seems to have some merit. The abstractions and universals created by the mind exist within the mind as long as the memory and body support them. They are indeed objects, even in the modern sense.
2. Ockhams razor is a great tool for scientific exploration. The simplest explanation that explains all of the observable phenomenon is possibly the best but, with time, even the simplest possible explanations are beyond the capacity of individual human beings. Looking at theoretical physics, this idea becomes very clear. Not only do physicists disagree at the higher levels of physics but the amount of information that exists in the field requires specialization and large to make any further headway. The reason I started writing this was because there was a claim that Ockham's view had changed significantly from what was in the first reading to what was in the second and I intended to show that the simple must sometimes become complex out of necessity. Upon closer inspection, I can find no such change. He initially stated that universals exist as objects in the soul and, in the second writing stated that they don't exist in the objective world outside of the soul. I see no change of view in the later writing but perhaps I am missing some subtlety. Hopefully, there will be a sudden revelation sometime between 2:00 and 3:00 pm this afternoon because I'm just not seeing any change in Ockham's view of universals from one writing to the next.
It seems as though William Ockham is attemping to get around problem about roses being out of season that was brought up against moderate realism. Although Ockham may seem to be a nominalist the idea that we can almost recreate what we know as a universal, in our minds after we view something, would solve the issue of the Aristotelian notion of form. However, Ockham isn't arguing that these universals are real but are instead abstracted into our minds and projected back into the world.
It is interesting how John Buridan explains that predicables such as names that are intended to be only predicate one thing, actually predicate many. He wants draw a similarity between predicables and universals. This seems to be a nominalist account of universals. Predicables can essentially replace universals.
1. I think Ockham is giving Scotus a run for his money. That being said, I used the text to speech application for much of this reading and I think that helped me understand the text a little bit better. Overall, it is an interesting perspective that Ockham raises regarding the existence of universals. He says that they are not actually generated in reality, but instead are abstracted out of reality and brought to existence in only in our minds.
2. I found it helpful how he drew an analogy from this sort of abstracting process to that of a builder who, based off what he sees in the world, draws a blueprint of that world in his mind, and then reproduces what he has seen. This blueprint is then the concept of the universal but it only exists in the mind and not in reality. Though it is used to make sense of, and create what is in reality.
1.) Ockhams nominalist position seems to be very nuanced, and is revolutionary In therms of the history of thought. However it seems as though his position allows for universals to be real particulars and is in some sense self deating. 2. The discrinction buridian makes about the different kinds of universals are immensely useful from a linguistic perspective, and they seem to add a lot of nauance to the conversation. As the universals that do not respect to causation can still be talked about in an empirical manner.
1. I can’t help but feel that I missed something in the first reading by Ockham. Ockham's first theory just seemed like a really long and drawn out description of how the imagination works. Was this really that foreign of concept in those days? That craftsman first imagine there creations as things of the mind then create them. 2. I think Ockham's description of the two senses of the word particular grants many philosophers the ability to solve the problem of universals. I also can't help but feel that this nods back to Scotus. There exist universals as well as particulars in the second sence of the word.Things which are one and cannot function as a sign of many. That being said, I am sort of disappointed he doesn't call for the definition of the word particular to be by convention understood by its second sence.
Ockham claims that the being exists in division, spit among that which consists inside the soul and outside of the soul. He goes on further to divide the being which consists outside of the soul into 10 categories. This is very thought provoking and interesting as it is a sort of blend of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism, as mentioned in class, and being more thoroughly detailed it is understandable why that was the concept. That the forms of logic exist as objective forms whilst other things like relations of reason are subjective exemplify this claim smoothly.
I had a tough time with this reading but understand the concept that universals are not based in reality but are created in our minds. This is a concept that I think is widly accpted today because as individuals we give meaning to objects and concepts by our selves or through our experiences.
2. I like how explains how these forms can't live out side and need to live within the soul which is why we are the ones attributing meaning to things. "therefore, since they [the second inten- tions] cannot really exist outside the soul, they can only exist objectively in the soul."
The Ockham reading offered an interesting perspective on how no particular substance is a universal, every substance is numerically one and a particular. because if a substance is one thing and not many things, than it is numerically one. the language used to describe the individualistic nature of the substance was interesting.
The section predictables was less clear and offered more confusion because he says that predictables and universals are not the same , but that predictables are universals and conversely, which confuses me.
Ockham’s point concerning the existence of universals is quite interesting. He believes that universals are not actually made in reality they are only created by the thoughts we have in our mind. His ideas a different from Scoutus’ and he attempts to give a better perspective when it comes to the idea of universals.
The way Ockham describes being is completely different from what I originally believed. He believes that the existence of being has to do with two parts what exists inside and outside of the soul. He then divides the soul into 10 distinct categories which I find interesting because he views the soul as a lot more complex than I view it. I also find his point about how forms must live inside the soul to be quite interesting.
1) I definitely feel like I follow Ockham's initial claim, regarding universals come to be by abstraction rather than by generation. Things we consider universals today, (love, fear, wonder, mystery), certainly appear to us as elusive abstractions. This appeared almost too obvious to me throughout the reading. 2) I had a hard time understanding Buridan's argument regarding predicable and their differentiation from universals. It appears that his conclusion is that universals are found within things, rather than being something that exists from within things.
1. The idea that forms don't actually exist as objects in the real world seems obvious from a modern perspective. We know more about the computer housed in our skulls then the medieval philosophers. Though I hope I am wrong, the mind is very likely not eternal and separate from the body and neither are the forms. What is more interesting and, for me, unexpected is when Ockham posits that forms have an objective existence within the soul (mind). This concept seems to have some merit. The abstractions and universals created by the mind exist within the mind as long as the memory and body support them. They are indeed objects, even in the modern sense.
ReplyDelete2. Ockhams razor is a great tool for scientific exploration. The simplest explanation that explains all of the observable phenomenon is possibly the best but, with time, even the simplest possible explanations are beyond the capacity of individual human beings. Looking at theoretical physics, this idea becomes very clear. Not only do physicists disagree at the higher levels of physics but the amount of information that exists in the field requires specialization and large to make any further headway. The reason I started writing this was because there was a claim that Ockham's view had changed significantly from what was in the first reading to what was in the second and I intended to show that the simple must sometimes become complex out of necessity. Upon closer inspection, I can find no such change. He initially stated that universals exist as objects in the soul and, in the second writing stated that they don't exist in the objective world outside of the soul. I see no change of view in the later writing but perhaps I am missing some subtlety. Hopefully, there will be a sudden revelation sometime between 2:00 and 3:00 pm this afternoon because I'm just not seeing any change in Ockham's view of universals from one writing to the next.
It seems as though William Ockham is attemping to get around problem about roses being out of season that was brought up against moderate realism. Although Ockham may seem to be a nominalist the idea that we can almost recreate what we know as a universal, in our minds after we view something, would solve the issue of the Aristotelian notion of form. However, Ockham isn't arguing that these universals are real but are instead abstracted into our minds and projected back into the world.
ReplyDeleteIt is interesting how John Buridan explains that predicables such as names that are intended to be only predicate one thing, actually predicate many. He wants draw a similarity between predicables and universals. This seems to be a nominalist account of universals. Predicables can essentially replace universals.
1. I think Ockham is giving Scotus a run for his money. That being said, I used the text to speech application for much of this reading and I think that helped me understand the text a little bit better. Overall, it is an interesting perspective that Ockham raises regarding the existence of universals. He says that they are not actually generated in reality, but instead are abstracted out of reality and brought to existence in only in our minds.
ReplyDelete2. I found it helpful how he drew an analogy from this sort of abstracting process to that of a builder who, based off what he sees in the world, draws a blueprint of that world in his mind, and then reproduces what he has seen. This blueprint is then the concept of the universal but it only exists in the mind and not in reality. Though it is used to make sense of, and create what is in reality.
1.) Ockhams nominalist position seems to be very nuanced, and is revolutionary In therms of the history of thought. However it seems as though his position allows for universals to be real particulars and is in some sense self deating.
ReplyDelete2. The discrinction buridian makes about the different kinds of universals are immensely useful from a linguistic perspective, and they seem to add a lot of nauance to the conversation. As the universals that do not respect to causation can still be talked about in an empirical manner.
1. I can’t help but feel that I missed something in the first reading by Ockham. Ockham's first theory just seemed like a really long and drawn out description of how the imagination works. Was this really that foreign of concept in those days? That craftsman first imagine there creations as things of the mind then create them.
ReplyDelete2. I think Ockham's description of the two senses of the word particular grants many philosophers the ability to solve the problem of universals. I also can't help but feel that this nods back to Scotus. There exist universals as well as particulars in the second sence of the word.Things which are one and cannot function as a sign of many. That being said, I am sort of disappointed he doesn't call for the definition of the word particular to be by convention understood by its second sence.
Ockham claims that the being exists in division, spit among that which consists inside the soul and outside of the soul. He goes on further to divide the being which consists outside of the soul into 10 categories. This is very thought provoking and interesting as it is a sort of blend of Neoplatonism and Aristotelianism, as mentioned in class, and being more thoroughly detailed it is understandable why that was the concept. That the forms of logic exist as objective forms whilst other things like relations of reason are subjective exemplify this claim smoothly.
ReplyDeleteI had a tough time with this reading but understand the concept that universals are not based in reality but are created in our minds. This is a concept that I think is widly accpted today because as individuals we give meaning to objects and concepts by our selves or through our experiences.
ReplyDelete2. I like how explains how these forms can't live out side and need to live within the soul which is why we are the ones attributing meaning to things. "therefore, since they [the second inten- tions] cannot really exist outside the soul, they can only exist objectively in the soul."
The Ockham reading offered an interesting perspective on how no particular substance is a universal, every substance is numerically one and a particular. because if a substance is one thing and not many things, than it is numerically one. the language used to describe the individualistic nature of the substance was interesting.
ReplyDeleteThe section predictables was less clear and offered more confusion because he says that predictables and universals are not the same , but that predictables are universals and conversely, which confuses me.
Christopher Atuahene
ReplyDeleteOckham’s point concerning the existence of universals is quite interesting. He believes that universals are not actually made in reality they are only created by the thoughts we have in our mind. His ideas a different from Scoutus’ and he attempts to give a better perspective when it comes to the idea of universals.
The way Ockham describes being is completely different from what I originally believed. He believes that the existence of being has to do with two parts what exists inside and outside of the soul. He then divides the soul into 10 distinct categories which I find interesting because he views the soul as a lot more complex than I view it. I also find his point about how forms must live inside the soul to be quite interesting.
1) I definitely feel like I follow Ockham's initial claim, regarding universals come to be by abstraction rather than by generation. Things we consider universals today, (love, fear, wonder, mystery), certainly appear to us as elusive abstractions. This appeared almost too obvious to me throughout the reading.
ReplyDelete2) I had a hard time understanding Buridan's argument regarding predicable and their differentiation from universals. It appears that his conclusion is that universals are found within things, rather than being something that exists from within things.