1.) I definitely find the nominalist view much more intuitive and appealing to my mind as a person in the 21st century. I wonder if you polled the citizens of secular nations how many people would say that they even believed in actual universals anymore? Needless to say the nominalist argument is extremely compelling. 2.) However I can’t help but wonder how God is treated under this view. If there are no universals what does this do to belief in God? Are we only left to accept his existence because of the razor? If so my problem is that the razor itself seems to just be wrong; nuclear physics is much more complex than the ideas of Newton and yet nuclear physics clearly interfaces with nature at a much more powerful level than Newtonian mechanics.
If I understand correctly, Ockham wants to argue that Scotus's idea of universals and individuality on the logical grounds that there is no unity besides the fact that all distinct universals are singulars. This line of argumentation seems valid due to the fact that on Scotus's view once souls for example, take on new traits it is as though they no longer are the same thing. Most of it is very abstract and hard to follow but I believe this is the first line of argumentation Ockham uses against Scotus's view.
It seems like Ockham is once againt pointing to this similar issue with the solution Scotus wants to make to save moderate realism instead of reverting to nominalism. The similar issue is this ostensible contradiction between multiples and oneness. Ochkam's take on nominalism is interesting in that it maintains that universals are mental but wants to draw the connection between mental language and overt language.
Early on in the reading, Ockham targets Scotus’s views of universals and, I think, really effectively addresses a simple issue with Scotus. Ockham recalls that Scotus himself argues that “everything outside the soul is singular,” and Ockham correctly points out that if this is the case, then singularity is the only unity. I think it is interesting that the distinction that Scotus made regarding the uniqueness of each single thing’s “form” (for lack of a batter word) is not an oversight of realism, nor his conceptualism, but actually a radical step in the direction of nominalism.
I think the appropriate thing for Ockham to focus on—that is the strongest argument in favor of conceptualism over nominalism—is the distinction between singular humanities or souls, and a universal humanity only made distinct by additions. He does address this starting on page 390, and I was inclined to agree, but his thesis here aligns well with my own intuitions, and I wonder how convincing he really is when approaching a conceptualist or a realist.
1. It was interesting how strong of a criticism Ockham delivered in his opening remarks for today's reading. He not only state's that Scotus' moderate realist view was off based, but rather that it was misguided and more so that it seemed to have within it an inherent contradiction. Ockham states on the opening page, "[of a trait that belongs to both individuals in a pair of opposites] whether it belongs to it of itself or through something else, as long as this state of affairs persists unchanged, the other opposite will not really belong to it, but rather will be absolutely denied of it" (387). This critique makes sense to me.
2. How can the same thing be an inherent and essential quality in two opposite things. For example, as Scotus continues his argument, he states, "the humanity in Socrates and the humanity in Plato are really distinguished; therefore, each of them is really on in number, and consequently neither is common" (390). Scotus goes on to clarify that things are distinguished by their inherent or essential qualities on not by qualities that are added to them extrinsically. Therefore, what distinguishes Socrates from Plato and characteristics that are inherent in his humanity, not what has been added to his humanity.
I like thw nomilist view and that unviersals arw based off human knowlege and a function of language.
I like how logic is the main drive for universals and how as rational beings we create universals. It gives power to humans and strips it from an un known entity.
1. I don't think that I was really able to understand Ockham's argument regarding universals. I think that this must be because I don't understand some of the vocabulary he is using. It is all very abstract. I recognize that there is no thing as identical objects in the world, but I also think that similarity is a real quality outside of the mind.
2. I was also mystified by Ockham's treatment of concrete and abstract nouns and intentions. I think it is almost remarkable how poorly I understand what he is saying. I feel like I could pose questions to clarify all the terms I don't understand, but it would be and extensive list.
Ockham seems to dislike the notion of universality (hence his nominal viewpoint). I enjoyed his dismantling of Scotus' viewpoint via logical analysis. I found myself agreeing with the following: "no thing is universal, neither completely nor-incompletely, neither actually nor potentially" (389). This highlights the complexity of individual humans as well as animals and objects. This is expanded when he argues that humanity in Socrates and Plato are uncommon, distinct. In contemporary society, the idea of individual humanity seems uncontroversial and perhaps given.
I found the distinction made between universals and singulars to be interesting. A singular in the reading was described as being different from a universal in that singulars are determined to one item. Essentially this means that universals must be made of several items considering that their only distinguishing feature between them and singulars is the number of items they determine.
The importance that Bosley put into the nature of Socrates and Plato is not something I expected to see. Bosley stated that whatever humans think is common amongst people is the nature of Socrates’, Plato, or some third entity. The fact that Bosley is stating that what people have in common is the nature of these two philosopher reveals the high regard he has for them. I compare the reverence Bosley has for Socrates and Plato to the reverence religious people have for prophets.
1.I had a hard time with this reading. I understand Ockham's conclusion that Scotus’ singular idea of things outside the soul falls apart logically, but I couldn't really follow each of his premises. I don't know if it was the language or the frame of mind I was when I sat down to read this, but there were points in which Ockham used terms that I didn't really understand. For example when he began using the term ‘no thing’ in the latter half of Ockham's attack on Scotus conceptualism. 2.I find it interesting that Ockham uses Aristotle's Categories as a way of explaining his nominalism. I don't necessarily think that Aristotle himself was a nominalist, but it seems like it didn't take much work on Ockham's end to make him read like one.
1.) I definitely find the nominalist view much more intuitive and appealing to my mind as a person in the 21st century. I wonder if you polled the citizens of secular nations how many people would say that they even believed in actual universals anymore? Needless to say the nominalist argument is extremely compelling.
ReplyDelete2.) However I can’t help but wonder how God is treated under this view. If there are no universals what does this do to belief in God? Are we only left to accept his existence because of the razor? If so my problem is that the razor itself seems to just be wrong; nuclear physics is much more complex than the ideas of Newton and yet nuclear physics clearly interfaces with nature at a much more powerful level than Newtonian mechanics.
If I understand correctly, Ockham wants to argue that Scotus's idea of universals and individuality on the logical grounds that there is no unity besides the fact that all distinct universals are singulars. This line of argumentation seems valid due to the fact that on Scotus's view once souls for example, take on new traits it is as though they no longer are the same thing. Most of it is very abstract and hard to follow but I believe this is the first line of argumentation Ockham uses against Scotus's view.
ReplyDeleteIt seems like Ockham is once againt pointing to this similar issue with the solution Scotus wants to make to save moderate realism instead of reverting to nominalism. The similar issue is this ostensible contradiction between multiples and oneness. Ochkam's take on nominalism is interesting in that it maintains that universals are mental but wants to draw the connection between mental language and overt language.
Early on in the reading, Ockham targets Scotus’s views of universals and, I think, really effectively addresses a simple issue with Scotus. Ockham recalls that Scotus himself argues that “everything outside the soul is singular,” and Ockham correctly points out that if this is the case, then singularity is the only unity. I think it is interesting that the distinction that Scotus made regarding the uniqueness of each single thing’s “form” (for lack of a batter word) is not an oversight of realism, nor his conceptualism, but actually a radical step in the direction of nominalism.
ReplyDeleteI think the appropriate thing for Ockham to focus on—that is the strongest argument in favor of conceptualism over nominalism—is the distinction between singular humanities or souls, and a universal humanity only made distinct by additions. He does address this starting on page 390, and I was inclined to agree, but his thesis here aligns well with my own intuitions, and I wonder how convincing he really is when approaching a conceptualist or a realist.
1. It was interesting how strong of a criticism Ockham delivered in his opening remarks for today's reading. He not only state's that Scotus' moderate realist view was off based, but rather that it was misguided and more so that it seemed to have within it an inherent contradiction. Ockham states on the opening page, "[of a trait that belongs to both individuals in a pair of opposites] whether it belongs to it of itself or through something else, as long as this state of affairs persists unchanged, the other opposite will not really belong to it, but rather will be absolutely denied of it" (387). This critique makes sense to me.
ReplyDelete2. How can the same thing be an inherent and essential quality in two opposite things. For example, as Scotus continues his argument, he states, "the humanity in Socrates and the humanity in Plato are really distinguished; therefore, each of them is really on in number, and consequently neither is common" (390). Scotus goes on to clarify that things are distinguished by their inherent or essential qualities on not by qualities that are added to them extrinsically. Therefore, what distinguishes Socrates from Plato and characteristics that are inherent in his humanity, not what has been added to his humanity.
I like thw nomilist view and that unviersals arw based off human knowlege and a function of language.
ReplyDeleteI like how logic is the main drive for universals and how as rational beings we create universals. It gives power to humans and strips it from an un known entity.
1. I don't think that I was really able to understand Ockham's argument regarding universals. I think that this must be because I don't understand some of the vocabulary he is using. It is all very abstract. I recognize that there is no thing as identical objects in the world, but I also think that similarity is a real quality outside of the mind.
ReplyDelete2. I was also mystified by Ockham's treatment of concrete and abstract nouns and intentions. I think it is almost remarkable how poorly I understand what he is saying. I feel like I could pose questions to clarify all the terms I don't understand, but it would be and extensive list.
Ockham seems to dislike the notion of universality (hence his nominal viewpoint). I enjoyed his dismantling of Scotus' viewpoint via logical analysis. I found myself agreeing with the following: "no thing is universal, neither completely nor-incompletely, neither actually nor potentially" (389). This highlights the complexity of individual humans as well as animals and objects. This is expanded when he argues that humanity in Socrates and Plato are uncommon, distinct. In contemporary society, the idea of individual humanity seems uncontroversial and perhaps given.
ReplyDeleteI found the distinction made between universals and singulars to be interesting. A singular in the reading was described as being different from a universal in that singulars are determined to one item. Essentially this means that universals must be made of several items considering that their only distinguishing feature between them and singulars is the number of items they determine.
ReplyDeleteThe importance that Bosley put into the nature of Socrates and Plato is not something I expected to see. Bosley stated that whatever humans think is common amongst people is the nature of Socrates’, Plato, or some third entity. The fact that Bosley is stating that what people have in common is the nature of these two philosopher reveals the high regard he has for them. I compare the reverence Bosley has for Socrates and Plato to the reverence religious people have for prophets.
Christopher Atuahene
Delete
ReplyDelete1.I had a hard time with this reading. I understand Ockham's conclusion that Scotus’ singular idea of things outside the soul falls apart logically, but I couldn't really follow each of his premises. I don't know if it was the language or the frame of mind I was when I sat down to read this, but there were points in which Ockham used terms that I didn't really understand. For example when he began using the term ‘no thing’ in the latter half of Ockham's attack on Scotus conceptualism.
2.I find it interesting that Ockham uses Aristotle's Categories as a way of explaining his nominalism. I don't necessarily think that Aristotle himself was a nominalist, but it seems like it didn't take much work on Ockham's end to make him read like one.